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The European Power Hierarchy, Member State Trust, and Public Support for 
the Common Security and Defense Policy 
 
By Gaspare M. Genna & Florian Justwan1 
 
 
Abstract 
Existing studies focus on overall support for European integration while less work has been done on 
explaining public opinion on specific policy areas, such as the development of the Common Security 
and Defense Policy (CSDP). We hypothesize that the probability of supporting a CSDP increases with 
greater levels of trust in the European Union member states, most notably the more powerful members. 
This variable is critical since integration’s development is influenced strongly by, and dependent on, the 
resources of the relatively more powerful European member states. Binary logistic regression analyses 
using pooled repeated cross-sectional data from the Eurobarometer surveys conducted from 1992 to 
1997 among individuals of 11 member states largely support these claims.  
 
 
The crises in the Ukraine and the Levant, and their impact on the EU, once again raise the issue of 
formulating a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The idea behind the CSDP is to secure the 
gains of regional integration from external threats with the goal of having a single European voice 
(Anderson and Seitz 2006; Howorth and Menon 2010; Posen 2006). The idea was first introduced as part 
of a border Common Foreign and Security Policy as one of three pillars of European integration in the 
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) and then later given a greater institutional framework in the 
Amsterdam Treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon created the office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and an intergovernmental approach of the CSDP among the member-states. 
Recently, the current High Representative, Federica Mogherini, stated that the EU “cannot rule out a 
military aspect of our work in the region and in the world.”2  
Scholars have long noted that EU citizens have strong support for the CSDP as measured by various 
Eurobarometer surveys (Wagner 2005; Tournier 2004; Brummer 2007). This can lead to the possible 
conclusion that the European public is providing the elite with a permissive consensus (Lindberg and 
Scheingold 1970). Individuals may be providing such a consensus in this policy area because they do not 
possess the adequate information to evaluate the CSDP given its outward appeal but unclear meaning 
(Heisbourg 2000; Jegen and Mérand 2014). However, the decline of permissive consensus of economic 
integration since the 1960s has taught us that EU leaders cannot rely on high levels of support indefinitely 
(Imig 2004). The defeat of the Constitutional Treaty, with strong provisions for a CSDP, is a clear 
illustration of this fact. Given the critical role many EU citizens have in the future of European integration 
through referenda, it is important to explain their level of support for a CSDP.  
We examine the CSDP as part of the overall plan to develop a political community among EU 
member states. A political community refers to the cohesion that emphasizes individuals being drawn 
together for the purpose of operating in a common structure. (Haas 1958; Easton 1965; Etzioni 1965). With 
greater political cohesion we would see greater support for European integration policies such as the CSDP. 
In the case of the EU, decision-making is primarily in the hands of the member states (Moravcsik 1991 & 
                                                     
1 Gaspare M. Genna, Department of Political Science, The University of Texas at El Paso, ggenna@utep.edu; 
Florian Justwan, Department of Political Science, The University of Idaho, fjustwan@uidaho.edu  
2 Nikolaj Nielsen, “EU considers ‘military approach’ to local threats.” EUobserver, May 15, 2015, accessed May 15, 
2015, https://euobserver.com/defence/128718.  
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1993). They, through Intergovernmental Conferences and the European Council, determine the amount of 
sovereignty given to EU institutions as well as the direction of integration.  
However, not all member states have equal weight in these decisions and an examination of the 
European power hierarchy is important when explaining integration (Efird and Genna 2002). The European 
power hierarchy refers to the pattern of power distribution among the member states and how decision-
making will generally focus on the preferences of the more powerful (i.e., larger and wealthier) member-
states. Therefore, when attempting to explain why individuals would support a CSDP, we need to consider 
how they perceive the motivations of the more powerful member states. The central argument that we put 
forward in this paper is that individuals’ support for the CSDP depends on the level of trust given to the 
more powerful member states, namely Germany, France, and the UK.  
The remainder of this paper has four sections. First, we discuss the existing literature on support for 
European integration. Second, we present the theory of this paper in greater detail and formulate testable 
hypotheses. Third, we describe the data that we use to test our theoretical claims. Fourth, we discuss the 
results of our statistical analysis. The final section concludes with some practical implications of our 
findings.  
 
Support for European Integration 
Addressing the question of why individuals would support a CSDP first requires an assessment of 
work on overall support for European integration. Easton’s (1965; 1975) theoretical work views public 
support as being either specific (also known as utilitarian support) or affective. We posit that motivations 
for utilitarian support are primarily self-interested in nature while affective support stems from a common 
interest motivation. Utilitarian support results from an exchange where outputs (which can be economic or 
non-economic gains for the individual) are provided by the state in order to maintain the system through 
citizen support (Easton 1965: 157). Researchers point out that individuals provide utilitarian support when 
they believe the EU can minimize the negative side effects produced by the integration of member states 
(Anderson and Reichert 1996). Feld and Wildgen’s (1976) work shows a tie between support levels in the 
four core countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) to that of welfare increases in the early 
years of integration. The attempt at explaining support continued with Handley (1981) who descriptively 
notes that the economic downturns of the 1970s dramatically lowered support levels for the EEC. 
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) refined the testing of this argument by looking at the various levels of 
influence on support levels with similar results. Others have also built upon this method of analysis with 
similar results (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Duch and Taylor 1997). Some researchers have taken a 
more direct approach by examining an individual’s socio-economic position in order to predict the 
probability of their support (Anderson 1991; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 
and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998; Brineger and Jolly 2005).  
Self-interested motivations are not necessarily economic. The founders of European integration were 
driven by the memories of catastrophic wars and hoped that regional integration would be a vehicle for a 
permanent peace (Deutsch et al 1957; Haas 1958; Etzioni 1965; Mitrany 1966). Europeans supported 
integration, in its early years, in part for its promise to prevent war (Hewstone 1986). However, with the 
passing memory of war and the end of the Cold War, physical security is not as strong a factor in supporting 
integration as it once was (Gabel 1998). Other benefits include a more effective form of governance that is 
lacking at the national level due to underdeveloped welfare benefits and high levels of corruption (Sánchez-
Cuenca 2000).  
While significant in their contribution, utilitarian models tells us only part of the story behind 
citizen support. The other half of the story begins by understanding affective support. Affective 
support is a “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate 
outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants” 
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(Easton 1965: 273). Affective support enters the picture when the political system has a 
“communal ideology” that promotes a common interest (Easton 1965: 333). One of the oldest work 
in this area is the postmaterialist argument. Inglehart (1971; 1977a; 1977b) claims that Europeans 
who were socialized in an environment of high rates of economic growth developed a different set 
of values from prior generations and that they are amiable toward the prospects of regional 
integration. However, Janssen (1991) and Gabel (1998) dispute this claim because their research 
finds little evidence for the relationship between postmaterialism and support for integration. The 
problem may not be the postmaterialist explanation, but what it was trying to explain. 
Postmaterialist theory cannot tell us how postmaterialists or materialists reach their opinions 
(Rochon 1998). In fact, it may be possible for both value categories to favor regional integration 
policy for different reasons. It is easy to see that materialists would be in favor if they believe that 
regional integration will provide material and physical security. One can assume that 
postmaterialists would be in favor if they believe that it is a means to solve trans-national problems 
(e.g. clean air, water, etc.).  
Other research that looks at affective support for integration has mainly focused on the role 
of factors that would impede the formation of the political community. They echo the claim by 
Dahl (1989) that an attachment allows for easier rule because it adds legitimacy to the governors 
by the governed. Holding a European identity does promote support for integration (Gable 1998; 
Berezin and Díez-Medrano 2008). McLaren (2002) demonstrates that hostility towards other 
cultures determines attitudes towards the European Union. Likewise, a strong national attachment 
lowers the probability that an individual will support regional integration (Carey 2002; De Vreese 
and Boomgaarden 2005; Elgün and Tillman 2007; Garry and Tilley 2009). In addition, Van 
Kersbergen (2000) explains support for the EU by examining the role integration has in forming 
primary national allegiances. His claim is that these attitudes pose a problem in developing a 
European identity and thereby lower the chances of supporting the EU. Interestingly, individuals 
that have an inclusive subnational identity are more likely to support integration because they hope 
the process of integration will strengthening their claims for greater autonomy (Jolly 2007; Fitjar 
2010; Chacha 2013).  
In this paper, we shift attention away from individuals’ direct evaluations of the EU and 
towards the evaluations of member states while focusing on the particular policy integration areas, 
of security and defense policy. We emphasize that common interest and self-interest are not 
mutually exclusive. By being part of a political community, an individual recognizes that one’s 
self-interest and the common interest are interdependent.  
A power hierarchy trust model for supporting the CSDP  
European integration has many potential benefits for member states. This is especially true in the area 
of security and defense. Closer cooperation in these realms provides the EU with the ability to speak with 
a louder voice on the world stage and thereby influence international outcomes consistent with the member 
states’ preferences. Despite this tangible advantage, integration of defense policies is also associated with 
potential costs for each member state. First, while the CSDP is intergovernmental in nature, which means 
that individual countries do formally retain sovereignty and veto rights, smaller countries risk the chance 
that they will occasionally be pressured informally to support defense policies that are not perfectly in line 
with their own national interests. For example, in the summer of 2013, Austria, the Czech Republic and 
Sweden had to accept lifting the arms embargo against Syria - an idea favored by the governments in 
London and Paris.3 Second, common security and defense implies that states are often times required to 
spend human and financial resources on policy initiatives championed by other members of the union. A 
                                                     
3 Joshua Chaffin, “UK and France win battle to lift EU’s Syria arms embargo,” Financial Times, May 28, 2013, 
accessed March 10, 2015, www.ft.com/cms/s/0/095e5e50-c6c1-11e2-8a36-00144feab7de.html#axzz3UAkaguoj. 
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case in point is the European provision of troops to secure the 2006 presidential elections in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. After an official UN request for a European military presence, France was one of 
the strongest supporters of a joint EU mission. At the same time, however, the government in Paris did not 
want to take the lead in this initiative. As a result, France and Germany engaged in a lengthy negotiation 
process which ended in Germany’s decision to lead the military operation (Koops et al 2011).  
In sum, agreeing to cooperation in the realm of defense and security policy requires member states 
to accept the risk of incurring tangible costs in the hopes that the long-term benefits of further integration 
are larger. Individual-level assessments of the CSDP should mirror this logic. If citizens believe that the 
benefits of security and defense policy integration outweigh the potential costs, they should be likely to 
support EU-level decision-making in this issue area. Conversely, if the risks of close cooperation are 
perceived as being too severe, citizens should prefer that security and defense policies remain the 
responsibility of their national governments.  
Even though this logic appears to be straightforward, making informed cost/benefit calculations about 
European affairs is difficult for citizens. EU decision-making is very complex and many deals and 
compromises in Brussels are forged behind closed doors. In addition, EU citizens are generally relatively 
uninformed about European affairs (Clark and Hellwig 2012; Elkink and Sinnott 2015). Schoen (2008) 
does demonstrate that utilitarian calculations are in play. He shows that individuals from member states 
with more powerful national militaries (as measured by nuclear capability), are less likely to support a 
CSDP because there is little added benefit for establishing joint policies in these areas. Individuals from 
member states with weaker military capabilities perceive an added benefit in integrating policies because 
they can take advantage of their more powerful partners’ capabilities. However, this argument assumes that 
the role of CSDP would be exclusively to deter external threats (Irondelle et al 2015). It is also important 
to point out that there is a great deal of individual variation regarding what such policies would entail 
(Irondelle et al. 2015), what common policies will be achieved (Carrubba and Singh 2004), and what this 
will mean with reference to NATO (Ray and Johnston 2007).  
In this environment of complexity and limited information, citizens rely on heuristics to interpret 
political events. These cognitive shortcuts enable individuals to generalize from abstract beliefs and to build 
opinions about political matters (Brewer and Steenbergen 2002). Affective attitudes like trust are especially 
important in this context since they reflect fundamental orientations of an individual’s personality. One 
often cited definition of trust is the perceived “probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group 
doing anything to bring them about” (Gamson 1968: 54). In paraphrasing Wintrobe (1995: 46), trust yields 
a stream of future returns on exchanges that would not otherwise take place because trust makes behavior 
predictable in the sense that citizens who trust believe that “their trustees have a responsibility to fulfill the 
trust placed in them even if it means sacrificing some of their own benefits” (Hoffman 2002: 379).  
In the context of European politics, individuals may support integration of Europe’s security and 
defense policies when they trust other member states. Given the absence of reliable information about the 
preferences and future behavior of countries, faith in other EU members allows citizens to give the benefit 
of the doubt to foreign governments and it leads individuals to have an optimistic outlook on the 
consequences of international cooperation. People who trust other countries assume that the preferences of 
states are compatible with each other. As a result, the benefits of integration in the area of security and 
defense policy outweigh the potential costs. By contrast, citizens who are distrustful of Europe’s member 
states should be more concerned about the risks and costs associated with deeper cooperation. These 
individuals fear that preferences between countries in Europe are incompatible and other governments 
cannot be assumed to take into account their country’s position and goals. Instead, people who distrust a 
particular country or a group of countries believe that these actors are willing to exploit the good intentions 
of other European states. Based on the discussion presented above, we can formulate the first testable 
7 
 
hypothesis about individual-level attitudes concerning European integration in the realm of defense and 
security policies. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who trust other member states of the European Union are more likely to support 
Europe’s common security and defense policies than individuals who are distrustful of other member states. 
 
While this hypothesis constitutes the first testable implication of our theory, additional considerations 
need to be made since trust in some states is a more important predictor for individual-level variation than 
faith in certain other actors. EU members vary widely in their weight in the decision-making process. Like 
in many other regions, relative wealth, population, and capabilities (among others) determine which 
country’s preferences will be enacted within the EU and which ones will be held in check. Specifically, the 
more powerful (the largest and wealthiest) countries will tend to have their wishes debated and 
implemented. Smaller countries, by contrast, are less likely to influence the direction of Europe’s security 
and defense policies (Moravcsik 1991 & 1993). Conceptually, Europe during the 1990s can be divided into 
two groups of countries. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom were (and still are) arguably the most 
influential member states. Their wealth and population size has historically allowed these actors to shape 
both the European integration process as well as external policies of the EU. The remaining states fall into 
a second tier of influence. Some of them are relatively wealthy, which allows them to have some influence 
on European affairs. Others have had historically limited influence on decisions at the European level and 
their sway over external EU policies is small.  
Being generally aware of this power hierarchy, citizen attitudes towards Europe’s security and 
defense policies should primarily be shaped by diffuse feelings towards those actors that have the greatest 
influence on the overall course within these policy areas. Specifically, this means that trust in Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom should be a crucial precondition for individual-level support of integration. 
In other words, most of the empirical relationship suggested in Hypothesis 1 should be driven by trust in 
these countries. By contrast, trust in the remaining EU member states should only explain a smaller (albeit 
important) amount of individual-level variation. This discussion allows us to introduce another set of 
testable hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Trust in the most powerful member states of the EU (Germany, France and Britain) should 
have a pronounced effect on individual-level assessments of Europe’s common security and defense 
policies. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Trust in the remaining member states of the EU should have a smaller effect on individual-
level assessments of Europe’s common security and defense policies. 
 
Data description and testing procedures 
In order to test these claims, we rely on public opinion data from multiple Eurobarometer surveys 
(1992-1997). These surveys were selected because they all included the key independent variables, trust in 
member states. While these survey waves are somewhat dated, they have two important advantages. First, 
data from this time period are very well suited to test hypotheses about citizen support of Europe’s common 
security and defense policy. As Clark and Hellwig (2012) show, the level of information that citizens have 
about a particular policy area crucially influences their degree of support for EU policy control. In the run-
up to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, policy-maker publicly debated the merits and downsides of deepened 
integration in this issue area, and - as a result - Europe’s common security and defense policy was a highly 
salient issue during the 1990s. Second, these data allow us to examine individual-level attitudes during the 
very early stages of integration in this policy domain. This enables us to conduct the “cleanest” possible 
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test for our theory. If we used survey data from a more recent time period (when political integration was 
already well under way), it would be difficult to analyze the role of trust without assessing how previous 
achievements in this issue area had shaped citizen attitudes.  
Given data constraints, the analysis includes only samples from eleven members of the EU, which 
include the first twelve members except Luxemburg. Some of the samples were collapsed while others were 
not included: The Northern Ireland sample was collapsed into the British sample and the East German 
sample was omitted given its unique attributes.4 We used a weighted variable (the nation weight) so that no 
sub-national group will be over or under representation and results can be interpreted with attention to 
variations within country samples.5 The appropriate technique is to employ binary logit regression models 
(Long 1997). The evaluations of the coefficients will be based on their significance, direction of signs, and 
their contribution to predicting the probabilities of the dependent variables.  
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is individual support for a common security and defense. A question 
frequently asked in the Eurobarometer surveys is whether a type of policy would be best handled at the 
national level or the European level of decision-making: 
Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the 
(NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly 
within the European Community [Union]. Which of the following areas of policy 
do you think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, and which should 
be decided jointly within the European Community.  
1.  Should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government 
2.  Should be decided jointly within the European Community [Union] 
Security and defense was one policy area presented to respondents. Responses were recoded so “national 
level decision-making” has a value of zero and “EC/U level decision-making” has a value of one.  
 
Independent variables – power hierarchy trust 
The main independent variables of this paper measure the respondents’ trust levels in other member-
states. Specifically, we rely on the following survey question from the Eurobarometer:6 
Which, if any, European Community [Union] country or countries do you think can be 
more trusted politically than others?  
0.  Not mentioned 1.  Mentioned 
 
                                                     
4 The East German sample may exhibit questionable results given its early phase of democratic transition and its 
recent membership at the time of the surveys, which may distort findings. One such fear is an inaccuracy of 
questionnaire responses due to the public’s long legacy of authoritarianism. 
 
5 The nature of the hypotheses requires an individual level analysis. While some researchers believe that aggregation 
of individual level responses to opinion surveys remove random “noise” from the measurements (Page and Shapiro 
1992; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), recent research shows that the error associated with individual level 
variation may be systemic (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000). Therefore aggregating the data would not remove 
any associated “noise,” but instead may harm the robustness of potential results due to a lower number of 
observations.  
 
6 While this question does not directly ask if the member-states can be trusted in the context of the EU or integration, 
the years in which they were asked (1992 – 1997) were years of the deepening of integration (implementation of 
the Single European Act and the Maastricht debate). The public discourse in these years would therefore reflect the 
saliency of the EU.  
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The respondents go through the list of member states and indicate which members are more trustworthy than others, 
including their own.7 The data was recoded so that all responses indicating trust in the respondent’s own country are 
considered missing because the independent variable is to measure trust in member states other than the 
respondent’s own state.  
 
Table 1. National samples for “power hierarchy trust” variables by year 
 
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
France ● ●  ● ● ● 
Germany ● ●  ● ● ● 
Britain ● ●  ● ● ● 
Spain ● ●  ● ● ● 
Italy ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Denmark   ●    
Ireland   ●    
Portugal   ●    
Belgium    ●   
Netherlands    ●   
Greece    ●   
 
This question was not posed to all national samples in all years. Table one indicates which countries’ 
populations were sampled by year. There is a larger frequency of respondents coming from France, 
Germany, Britain, Italy, and Spain. The Danes, Irish, Portuguese, Belgians, Dutch, and Greeks were polled 
only once either in 1994 or 1995. Only the Italians were polled consistently from 1992-1997. Since the 
Luxemburg respondents were not polled at all, this leaves a total of eleven national samples. This pattern 
of sampling is not a statistical problem for two reasons. First, since the nation weight is employed in the 
analysis, the results explain within-country variances. Therefore no biases are introduced. Second, since 
country dummy variables are also employed (see the following section), the analysis will control for country 
effects. According to our theory, trust in EU member states influences an individual’s attitudes towards the 
common security and defense policy. In order to measure citizen-levels of trust in other EU countries, we 
create an additive index based on the survey item described above. Specifically, we add up the number of 
member states that an individual trusts and divide this sum by twelve (the overall number of EU member 
states in 1992). This variable enables us to test the first hypothesis derived from our theory. Hypotheses 2 
and 3 however, requires a more fine grained measure of trust. As stated above, we expect that trust in the 
more powerful member states should have a larger effect on individual-level support than trust in less 
powerful countries. We therefore created two additional variables for trust in Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom and trust in the less influential member states (hereafter “second tier”), respectively. The 
specific approach is similar to the one described earlier: we add the number of trusted member states in 
each country group and divide the sum by the number of states per group (i.e. 3 for trust in Germany, France 
and the UK and 9 for trust in “second tier” member states). By dividing the additive term by the appropriate 
number, the range of both trust variables is restricted to be between zero and one, thereby allowing 
comparability.  
 
                                                     
7 So as to include consistency for the 1992-1997 analysis, only trust in the first twelve members of the EU are included.  
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Control variables 
In the following analysis, we account for a standard set of covariates employed in the literature on public 
opinion and European integration.  
Education. First, we control for education. To measure this variable, we use a standard question found 
in all Eurobarometer surveys. The question asked respondents how old they were when they stopped full-
time education. The responses are then collapsed into 9 groups: individuals who completed their education 
at the age of 14 receive a value of “1”. Each additional year of schooling is then associated with a one-unit 
increase on this indicator. A score of “9” is assigned to those who finished their education after the age of 
22.  
Age. This information, measured in years, is included in the regular set of demographic variables 
found in the Eurobarometer surveys. The variable was recoded into six categories representing specific age 
cohorts. Each category’s range is 10 years starting from 15 years of age. The sixth category includes 
everyone that is 65 years of age and older. An alternative argument would be that memories of war would 
influence older Europeans to favor common security and defense policies, more so than younger Europeans. 
Prior research on support for integration demonstrated that this factor has diminished as the memory of the 
war fades (Gabel 1998). However, it may still prove important in the context of this analysis.  
Income. In order to measure an individual’s income level, the Eurobarometer asked respondents to 
choose from among four categories that approximates their annual household income. The expectation for 
this variable is that higher levels of economic wealth are associated with stronger support for Europe’s 
CSFD policies. 
Ideology. Next, we control for ideology. Prior research has demonstrated convincingly that an 
individual’s position on the left-right spectrum partially determines his/her degree of support for integration 
(McLaren 2002; Carey 2002). In order to account for this relationship, we include a control variable in our 
statistical model that captures whether a survey respondent self-identifies as liberal, conservative or 
moderate. This indicator ranges from 1 (very liberal) to 10 (very conservative).  
Support for EU membership: A final substantive control variable employed in the statistical analysis 
of this paper captures individuals’ level of support for their country’s membership in the EU. If citizens are 
opposed to the European integration project as a whole, it should be unlikely that they express favorable 
views about close cooperation in the realm of security and defense policies (Schoen 2008). By controlling 
for general support for integration using a retrospective measure, we can isolate the variance associated 
with support for common security and defense policies. The specific survey item used to measure general 
support for EU integration asked respondents whether they believe that EU membership is a “good thing” 
for their country, “neither good nor bad” or “a bad thing.” Descriptive statistics for all covariates described 
above can be found in Table 2.  
Country and year effects. Finally, country and year dummies are included in each of the models in 
order to control for effects that are specific to either the countries in the analysis or the year of the surveys. 
In each regression the base country is Belgium and the base year is 1992. Results are omitted due to space 
constraints. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
     
DV: Support for Common Defense Policy 0 1 0.50 0.50 
     
Trust (all EU member states) 0 1 0.13 0.18 
Trust (GER/FRA/UK) 0 1 0.22 0.30 
Trust in Second Tier 0 1 0.10 0.17 
Trust in Germany 0 1 0.28 0.45 
Trust in France 0 1 0.21 0.41 
Trust in UK 0 1 0.16 0.37 
Support for EU membership 1 3 2.51 0.71 
Age 1 6 3.33 1.71 
Education 1 10 4.23 2.84 
Income 1 4 2.62 1.11 
Ideology 1 10 5.25 2.02 
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Explaining support for the Common Security and Defense Policy 
We introduced the variables described above in a series of five statistical models. In Model 1 we estimate 
the effect of trust in all member states on individual-level support of the CSDF. In Model 2, we use the 
more fine grained measures of trust and assess whether positive views of Germany, France and the UK are 
qualitatively different from faith in the less influential EU countries.  
 
Table 3. Logit models: Support for EU defense and security policy  
 
Coefficient 
(Robust Standard Error) 
Model 1 
 
Model 2  
 
Trust (all EU members)  0.544*** 
(0.158) 
-- 
Trust (GER/FRA/UK) --  0.277** 
(0.110) 
Trust in Second Tier --  0.254** 
(0.119) 
Support for EU membership  0.610*** 
(0.035) 
 0.605*** 
(0.033) 
Age  0.018 
(0.020) 
 0.018 
(0.021) 
Education  0.068*** 
(0.005) 
 0.068*** 
(0.005) 
Income  0.038 
(0.032) 
 0.037 
(0.032) 
Ideology -0.040** 
(0.018) 
-0.041** 
(0.017) 
Constant -1.716 
(0.111) 
-1.727 
(0.115) 
Number of Observations 16,111 16,111 
Log-Likelihood -10,085.47 -10,081.47 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01  
Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses. Estimates 
for country & year dummies omitted due to space constraints. 
   
 
 
Model 1 (Table 3) offers a test of our first hypothesis. The results indicate that trust in other member 
states increases the likelihood that a respondent supports common EU action with regards to security and 
defense policies. The coefficient estimate for trust in all EU members is both positive and statistically 
significant. In addition, the substantive effect of this covariate is substantial.  
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Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Support for the EU’s Common Defense Policy 
 
 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 1, holding all control variables at their median values, the probability that 
a survey respondent supports a CSDF is about 50.0 percent if this individual distrusts all other member 
states of the EU. However, as the share of trusted EU countries increases to 1 (that is, if a citizen expresses 
trust for every member of the European Union), the predicted probability rises markedly and significantly 
to 61.7 percent. In other words, across the full range of this variable, the relative risk of support for a 
common security and defense policy increases by over 23 percent. This suggests that trust in the member 
states of the European Union is a crucially important factor for support of a common security and defense 
policy. After testing Hypothesis 1, we now move to an examination of the second proposition of our theory.  
In Model 2, we estimate the effect of (1) trust in Germany France and the UK as well as (2) trust in 
the other EU members. Here, both coefficients exert a significant effect on the outcome variable. Holding 
all controls at their median values (see Table 4), the probability of support for EU policy control is about 
50.3 percent for individuals who distrust Germany, France and the United Kingdom. If a respondent trusts 
one of these countries, the probability rises to 52.0 percent and trust in two of these states is associated with 
a predictive margin of 53.9 percent. Finally, citizens who harbor positive views of all of these states have 
a 57.3 percent probability of expressing support for Europe’s common defense policy. This means that the 
relative risk increases by 13.9 percent across the range of this variable. Faith in the other member states of 
the EU has a similar effect on the level of support. Complete distrust in the remaining member states results 
in a predicted probability of 51.0 percent. The corresponding value for citizens who trust all remaining EU 
countries, by contrast, is 56.9 percent. This suggests two major implications. First, both types of trust 
contribute to more positive views of EU integration in the realm of defense policy. Second, and consistent 
with our theoretical expectations, the effect of trust in Germany, France and the UK is bigger than the effect 
of trust in other member states. While trust in the “big three” raises the relative risk of support by 13.9 
percent, trust in other EU members affects the relative risk by 11.6 percent.  
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Table 4. Substantive Effect of Trust and Control Variables 
 
 
A number of control variables are statistically significant as well. In line with our expectations, 
overall support for a country’s EU membership is strongly associated with more favorable attitudes towards 
integration of Europe’s defense policies. Citizens who believe that EU membership is a “good thing for 
their country” have a 59.5 percent probability of support. By contrast, the prediction for respondents who 
are highly skeptical of the European Union is only 32.2 percent. Furthermore, education and ideology are 
strongly associated with attitudes in this area. Specifically, more educated and more left-leaning 
respondents tend to exhibit higher levels of support for defense integration. Across the full ranges of these 
variables, the relative risk of support changes by 29 percent (education) and 14.8 percent (ideology). These 
findings are consistent with existing research on the subject matter (Schoen 2008; Irondelle et al 2015) and 
they show that the effect sizes of the trust variables in Model 2 are comparable to the impact of an 
individual’s self-placement on the left-right spectrum.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Min Max Pr(support) at 
mina 
Pr(support) at 
max 
Relative Change 
Model 2:      
Trust (GER/FRA/UK)  0 1 50.3% 57.3% +13.9% 
Trust in Second Tier  0 1 51.0% 56.9% +11.6% 
Support for EU membership 1 3 32.2% 59.5% +84.8% 
Education 1 10 46.9% 60.5% +29.0% 
Ideology 1 10 55.4% 47.2% - 14.8% 
      
Model 3:      
Trust in Germany 0 1 47.5% 55.0% +15.8% 
Trust in Second Tier  0 1 49.3% 55.6% +12.8% 
a Predicted probabilities are significant at the .05-level.  All other variables are at their medians.  
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Table 5. Logit models: Support for EU defense and security policy (Trust in Germany, France, UK) 
 
 
Coefficient 
(Robust Standard Error) 
Model 3 
 
Model 4  
 
Model 5 
Trust in Germany  0.337*** 
(0.066) 
-- -- 
Trust in France --  0.076 
(0.055) 
-- 
Trust in UK -- -- -0.092 
(0.071) 
Trust in Second Tier  0.292** 
(0.146) 
 0.379** 
(0.162) 
 0.385*** 
(0.093) 
Support for EU membership  0.610*** 
(0.037) 
 0.590*** 
(0.032) 
 0.638*** 
(0.043) 
Age  0.012 
(0.025) 
 0.015 
(0.025) 
 -0.001 
(0.018) 
Education  0.067*** 
(0.006) 
 0.069*** 
(0.006) 
 0.069*** 
(0.001) 
Income  0.037 
(0.040) 
 0.062** 
(0.027) 
 0.011 
(0.022) 
Ideology -0.045** 
(0.020) 
-0.041* 
(0.023) 
-0.023 
(0.014) 
Constant -1.715*** 
(0.139) 
-1.616*** 
(0.150) 
-1.679*** 
(0.144) 
Number of Observations 13.248 13.312 13.075 
Log-Likelihood -8303.02 -8286.99 -8076.57 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01   
Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses. Estimates for country & year 
dummies omitted due to space constraints. 
    
 
The results presented above provide strong support for both of our hypotheses and they suggest that 
trust in the more powerful member states is substantively more important for individual-level support of 
the CSDP than trust in the remaining member states. This leaves us with one important unanswered 
question: what is the relative importance of trust in Germany, trust in France, and trust in the U.K? In order 
to solve this puzzle, we estimated the effect of trust in Germany (Model 3), France (Model 4), and Britain 
(Model 5) on the common security and defense policy while controlling for average trust in the remaining 
member states. This stepwise approach is necessary since trust in Germany, France, and Britain is measured 
with three separate variables. Introducing all of these covariates into the same regression model would lead 
to a significant drop in the number of observations. As mentioned earlier, faith in one’s own country is 
coded as “missing.” Therefore, simultaneously controlling for attitudes about Germany, France, and Britain 
would lead to an exclusion of survey responses from all of these countries which would likely introduce 
systematic bias into our statistical results.  
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The regressions (displayed in Table 5) provide an even more fine-grained insight into attitudinal 
patterns. Combined, they suggest that trust in Germany has the biggest effect on individual-level support 
for defense integration. The coefficient estimate for this variable (Model 3) is positive and clearly 
distinguishable from zero while the covariates capturing trust in France and trust in the United Kingdom 
(Models 4 and 5) fail to reach statistical significance. Moreover, the substantive effect for trust in Germany 
is larger than the impact of any of the trust variables in Model 2. Respondents who distrust the country have 
a 47.5 percent probability of expressing favorable attitudes towards a CSDP. Conversely, citizens who do 
harbor favorable views of Germany have a 55 percent probability of support, which amounts to a change 
in the relative risk of almost 16 percent. By contrast, trust in the remaining EU members is only associated 
with a relative change of about 13 percent.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The trust model can be an aid in explaining the probabilities for supporting the CSDP. Trust in the 
member-states among individuals is significantly associated with higher probabilities of support. However, 
not all member states have the same impact. Two distinct groupings exist with each grouping determined 
by country size and wealth. The smaller and less wealthy a country is, the less of an impact it has on 
influencing support for a CSDP. But when it comes to the top powers in Europe (Germany, France, and 
Britain) clear distinctions are made among the respondents. Trust in the three top European powers is better 
able to explain support for a CSDP than overall trust and trust in the remaining member states.  
Two important issues must be considered with regard to these results. Neither of these issues would 
necessarily put into question the results found in this paper, but are important enough to consider. First, 
given that the earliest surveys used in this analysis are over twenty years old, we would need to obtain up-
to-date data that indicates that the association between trust and support has not changed. However, there 
is nothing in the model’s logic that makes the arguments any less salient today. Most of the year dummy 
variables were not significantly different from the base year, which indicates that there is a lack of temporal 
influence. However, more current data is an important way to determine if the findings of the 1990s hold 
today.  
Second, the EU’s eastward expansion adds complexity to model. The security and defense policies 
of countries such as Poland and the Baltic states are not in line with those of Germany. Decisions on troop 
deployments to Iraq, heated disagreements at EU Council meetings over the Iraqi war, and debates about 
the most appropriate foreign policy towards Russia are evidence of this. If our results hold, less trust in 
Germany in the post-Cold War membership expansion may lead to less support for a CSDP.  
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